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Article 5

Sarbanes-Oxley Five Years Later: Hero or Villain
Charles W. Murdock*

I. INTRODUCTION

Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted as the culmination of the outcry against
the corporate scandals that came to light in the early 2000s. The mantra
"business is good, government is bad" was temporarily reversed as
investors lost billions of dollars and employees lost their retirement
benefits. Government was called upon to act, and the notion that the
market, alone, solves all problems was proven false when it was clear
that companies like Enron could so easily dupe the market.
However, it did not take long for the pendulum to begin to swing
back as business railed against the costs of compliance with SarbanesOxley. While many projected that compliance was likely to result in
very modest costs, l the actual costs mushroomed, arguably because the
accounting profession overreacted. 2 Businesses began to call for the
repeal of Sarbanes-Oxley. 3 Accordingly, five years after its adoption,
this is an appropriate time to review the legislation and its impact, and
to assess whether its benefits outweigh its burdens.
Part II of this Article briefly reviews the circumstances that led to the
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. In particular, it analyzes two high profile
examples of corporate corruption, the complicity of the accounting
profession, and supine boards of directors who failed to fulfill their
oversight responsibility.
Part III discusses the requirement that
management certify the accuracy of financial statements and the
efficacy of internal controls, and the requirement that auditors attest to
* Professor and Loyola Faculty Scholar, Loyola Univeristy Chicago School of Law.

1. Congress initially estimated the average cost of compliance for a company to be about
$91,000. See infra text accompanying note 99. However, actual costs ran into the millions of
dollars for many companies. See infra text accompanying notes 100-103 (detailing the estimated
low cost of compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 121-134 (describing how costs outpaced estimates due
in part to the overreaction of public accounting firms).
3. See generally Cheryl L. Wade, Sarbanes-Oxley Five Years Later: Will Criticism of Sox
Undermine the Act's Benefits?, 39 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 595 (2008) (examining whether criticism of
SOX will prevent it from achieving its underlying goals).
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the operation of internal controls. These provisions have generated the
most controversy. Consequently, Part IV analyzes what arguably has
gone wrong with Sarbanes-Oxley. It then discusses the interpretive
guidance the SEC recently released, intended to alleviate the
unnecessary burdens Sarbanes-Oxley has placed on businesses. Parts V
and VI analyze the benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley and discuss how the
business community has overreacted to regulation and litigation.
The Article concludes that the policy behind Sarbanes-Oxley is
essential for the proper functioning of efficient capital markets. Thus,
business, instead of bemoaning the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, should
adopt a new mantra: "Why Not Tell the Truth?"
II. THE EVENTS LEADING TO SARBANES-OXLEY
Many factors contributed to the corporate corruption that led to
Sarbanes-Oxley.
The prime factor was corporate management's
personal greed and lust for power. However, courts and legislatures
also bear responsibility for approving or adopting procedures and rules
that discouraged litigation, thereby protecting management from
oversight. This lack of oversight from litigation facilitated the failure to
hold corporate management accountable for their actions. 4 Without the
threat of litigation, corporate directors, accountants, and others who
winked at wrongdoing became passive and supine; thus, they failed to
hold corporate management accountable. While there will always be
wrongdoing, one of the great failures during this period was the failure
5
of "gatekeepers" to fulfill their responsibilities.
Let's take a look at Arthur Andersen. At the start of the 1990s,
Arthur Andersen was regarded as a paragon of virtue. The name was
synonymous with integrity. Paul Volcker, prominent financial advisor
and former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, noted the irony that "[t]en
or fifteen years ago Arthur Andersen was considered the class of
accounting, the gold standard, how to do it, how to organize an
accounting firm." 6 Unfortunately, in the 1990s, Arthur Andersen was

4.

Charles W. Murdock, Sarbanes-Oxley, CorporateCorruption,and the Complicity of Courts

and Legislatures (Sept. 7, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract= 1012970 [hereinafter CorporateCorruption].
5. See JOHN C. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

(2006) (explaining the rise and development of gatekeepers, those who advise and inform boards
of directors, and how their failure to raise red flags about questionable practices contributed to
corporate scandals).
6.

NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Newsmaker Paul Volcker (PBS television broadcast Mar. 12,

2002), transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/jan-june02/volcker312.html.
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involved in major corporate frauds involving Waste Management,
7
Sunbeam, the Baptist Foundation of Arizona, and, of course, Enron.
Thus, within about a decade, the firm went from a conservative
accounting firm to one that was operating on the edge, leading to its
8
indictment and felony conviction.
Pushing the envelope like Arthur Andersen did is risky business.
Justice Brandeis acknowledged the dangerous, yet common, tendency
for humans to test the limits:
[Y]our lawyers.., can tell you where a fairly safe course lies. If you
are walking along a precipice no human being can tell you how near
you can go to that precipice without falling over, because you may
stumble on a loose stone... ; but anybody can tell you where you can
walk perfectly safely within convenient distance of that precipice.
The difficulty which men have felt . . . has been rather 9that they
wanted to go to the limit rather than they wanted to go safely.
Reams of paper have been written about Enron and Arthur
Andersen, 10 so that matter will not be belabored here. Instead, let's
look at just one transaction that illustrates the "envelope pushing" that
Arthur Andersen and Enron management engaged in under the nose of a
supine board of directors.
The transaction which ultimately brought Enron down is depicted in
the following illustration. 1 If it looks complicated, that's because it
12
was-crooks seldom operate on the "KISS" principle.

7.

SUSAN E. SQUIRES ET AL., INSIDE ARTHUR ANDERSEN: SHIFTING VALUES, UNEXPECTED

CONSEQUENCES 113 (Jim Boyd ed., 2003).
8. Id. (explaining the shifting values at Arthur Andersen that led to their ultimate undoing with

the Enron scandal).
9. Hearings Before S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, S. Res. 98, 62nd Cong. 1161 (1911)
(statement of Louis D. Brandeis).
10. See, e.g., ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (Nancy B. Rapoport &
Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) (a collection of articles about Enron, the business world, the legal
environment, and ethics).
11. The information in the diagram and accompanying text is derived from WILLIAM C.
POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITrEE
OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. (2002), available at http://www.broadbandcspan.org/downloads/powersreport.pdf [hereinafter THE POWERS REPORT].
12. See Charles W. Murdock, The Attorney as "Creator" or "Author": Attorney Liability
Under Enron, CBA RECORD, Apr. 2003, at 34 (the "KISS" principle stands for "keep it simple
stupid," which is what an honest person does; in this article, the author coined the acronym
"MICI," which stands for "make it complex idiot," which is what crooks employ).
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Enron had acquired 5.4 million shares of Rhythms Net Connection, a
private Internet broadband provider, for $10 million, or about $1.85 per
share. 13 A few months later, Rhythms was taken public at $21 per share
15
in a hot market. 14 The price rose to $69 on the first day of trading.
Enron thus had a valuable mercantile asset, but one that was very
volatile. The asset was marked to market and Enron realized income or
loss as the value of Rhythms stock rose or fell. 16 Consequently, Enron
wanted to hedge the value of Rhythms.
Andrew Fastow, Enron's CFO, proposed the "hedging" transaction
reflected in the diagram above. 17 Pursuant to this transaction, Enron
transferred 3.4 million of its own shares to LJM Cayman ("LJM"), an

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

THE POWERS REPORT, supra note 11, at 77.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 78.
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Enron subsidiary run by Fastow. 18 The shares were then worth $276
million, but Enron placed a four-year restriction on any subsequent sale
of the shares that supposedly reduced the value of the shares to $168
million. 19 In exchange for the shares that Enron transferred to LJM,
LJM gave Enron a note for $64 million and LJM Swap Sub ("Swap
Sub"), an LJM subsidiary also controlled by Fastow, gave Enron a put
option whereby Enron could require Swap Sub to repurchase the 5.4
million shares of Rhythms stock at $56 a share. 20 The put was valued at
about $20 per share, or about $104 million. 2 1 LJM funded Swap Sub by
transferring 1.6 million Enron shares, worth about $80 million, and
$3.75 million in cash to Swap Sub.2 2 Thus, Enron gave LJM stock
worth $168 million and received a note from LJM for $64 million and a
put from Swap Sub worth $104 million. 23 In this manner, Enron
supposedly hedged the value of the Rhythms stock at $56 per share,
and thus avoided having to declare a loss whenever the value of
Rhythms' stock fell.24
In order for the hedge to work, Swap Sub had to be independent of
Enron so that if Enron were doing poorly, Swap Sub had an independent
source of funds to draw upon to fulfill its obligations. To qualify as a
supposed independent "special-purpose entity" ("SPE"), Swap Sub was
required to have at least 3% equity. 25 Because Swap Sub had about $84
million in assets, it needed about $2.5 million of equity. 26 Fastow told
the Enron Board that he invested $1.0 million of his own money in
Swap Sub, but, even if true, this would fall short of the requisite equity.
Because the put obligation of Swap Sub was $104 million, but Swap
million plus
Sub had only 1.6 million Enron shares worth about $80
27
$3.75 million in cash, Swap Sub was basically insolvent.
Arthur Andersen originally signed off on this arrangement, which had
the effect of protecting Enron's income by avoiding a charge to earnings
18. Id. at 80. LJM Cayman was supposed to operate independently of Enron, but Fastow's
involvement as both Enron's CFO and manager of LJM presented a potential conflict of interest.
Id. at 78-81. Enron's board approved the arrangement. Id. at 79.
19. Id. at 80.
20. Id. at 80-81.
21. Id. at81.
22. Id. at 80.
23. Id. at 80-81.
24. Id. at 80-83.
25. See Emerging Issues Task Force, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Issue No. 90-15,
Impact of Nonsubstantive Lessors, Residual Value Guarantees, and Other Provisions in Leasing
Transactions (1990).
26. THE POWERS REPORT, supra note 11, at 83.
27. Id. at 80-81.
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if the Rhythms stock should decline in value. This approval was highly
dubious, not only because Swap Sub was not a legitimate SPE since it
lacked the requisite 3% capital but also because Swap Sub's assets were
comprised of Enron stock. In effect, Enron was using its own stock to
support the value of its stock. If the value of both the Rhythms stock
and the Enron stock decreased, Swap Sub could not honor its obligation
to repurchase the Rhythms stock, and the earnings of Enron would
further deteriorate due to the loss incurred in marking the Rhythms
stock to market. This type of circular arrangement was previously
rejected in U.S. v. Simon, in which accountants were held criminally
liable for using corporate stock indirectly to prop up the value of a
corporate asset.2 8 Two years later, Andersen claimed it became
Sub met the 3% equity test and required
concerned about whether Swap
29
Enron to restate its earnings.
This is a classic example of operating "on the edge," in fact, over the
edge. The transaction used multiple entities and involved a member of
Enron management who had a conflict of interest. The parties
attempted to do indirectly what could not be done directly: namely, to
use Enron stock to support the value of Enron stock by eliminating the
mark to market risk of Rhythms stock, a mercantile asset. Twenty years
earlier, in the Simon case, accountants went to jail for approving a
similar gambit.
How did Andersen move from being a conservative, gold standard
accounting firm to a sleazy one? It is an oversimplification to say that
the partners were greedy and would do anything to get more business.
What was the environment in which they operated, the environment that
produced a "what, me worry" type mentality? Clearly, the Supreme
Court's elimination of aiding and abetting liability for fraud or
misrepresentations in connection with securities sales in Central Bank
of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. contributed to
this mentality. 30 Yet, because accountants are liable as a primary

28. United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969).
29. THE POWERS REPORT, supra note 11, at 83-84.
30. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164
(1994). The issue of whether aiding and abetting liability existed under Rule lOb-5 was not
litigated in the courts below, nor was it initially presented to the Supreme Court on appeal. See
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 508 U.S. 959 (1993) (granting the
petition for certiorari). Nevertheless, the Court directed the parties to brief this issue and,
notwithstanding the fact that all eleven of the Courts of Appeal had recognized a private cause of
action against aiders and abettors under rule lOb-5, the Court determined that such a cause of
action could no longer be brought under rule I Ob-5. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 175-76.
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violator for misrepresentations in audited financial statements, 3 1 even
after aiding and abetting liability was eliminated they remained at risk
under the securities laws for audited statements. However, Central
Bank removed any risk of accountant liability for interim statements or
for consulting services. In addition to accountants, Central Bank also
let attorneys, investment advisors, and other professionals off the
32
hook.
Arthur Andersen was not alone in failing to fulfill its "watchman" or
"gatekeeper" responsibilities. On paper, Enron also had a gold standard
board of directors. 33 Similarly, the audit committee, on paper, appeared
31. The ink was hardly dry on the Central Bank opinion before much of the anticipated
benefit to accountants was dissipated in Kendall Square Research Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F. Supp.

26 (D. Mass 1994). In Kendall Square, plaintiffs alleged losses as a result of the company's
material overstatements of revenue and sued several defendants, including Price Waterhouse. Id.
at 27. The auditing firm had issued an unqualified audit opinion on the company's 1992 fiscal
results which were filed with the company's 10K report. Id. The Court held that, while
reviewing and approving quarterly statements does not constitute the "making" of a
misrepresentation, nor does "structuring" the transactions, the cause of action could proceed "on
the basis of the unqualified audit opinion," which was a representation to the investing public. Id.
at 28-29.
32.

Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 164. The Supreme Court, in Stoneridge Investment Partners,

LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008), affirmed the Eighth Circuit, noting that the
Eighth Circuit had determined that "any deceptive statement or act respondents made was not
actionable because it did not have the requisite proximate relation to the investors' harm."
Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769. The Supreme Court found that such conclusion "is consistent with
our own determination that respondents' acts or statements were not relied upon by the investors
and that, as a result, liability cannot be imposed upon respondents" Id. The majority declined to
limit the scope of Central Bank. For a criticism of both positions, see Justice Stevens' dissenting
opinion. Id. at 774 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33. The Enron Board of Directors were: Robert A. Belfer, Chairman of Belco Oil & Gas,
prior to 1986, President & Chairman of Balco Petroleum, 100% Enron subsidiary; Norman P
Blake Jr., CEO of Comdisco, Director of Owens-Coming; Ronnie Chan, Chairman of Hang
Lung Group (a Hong Kong development company), also director of Motorola & Standard
Chartered PLC; John H. Duncan, Former Chairman of the Executive Committee of Gulf &
Western Industries, Inc. and Investor, director of EOTT Energy; Wendy L. Gramm, former
Chairman of the U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Commission; Ken L. Harrison, former
Chairman and CEO of Portland General Electric Company; Robert K. Jaedicke, former Dean of
the Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, also director Boise Cascade and California
Water Service Company; Kenneth L. Lay, Enron Chairman, also Director of EOTT Energy, Eli
Lilly, Compaq, 12 Technologies, and New Power Holdings; Charles A. Lemaistre, former
President Emeritus of the University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center; John Mendelsohn:,
President of the University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, director of Im Clone
Systems; Jerome J. Meyer, Chairman, Tektronix, Inc.; Paulo V. Ferraz Pereira, Exec. V.P. of
Group Bozano, former President and CEO of State Bank of Rio de Janeiro; Frank Savage,
Chairman of Alliance Capital Management International, also director of Lockheed Martin and
Qualcomm; Jeffrey K. Skilling, President and CEO of Enron Corp., also director of Houston
branch of Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas; John A. Urquhart, Senior Advisor to Enron Chairman,
former Senior Vice President of Industrial and Power Systems, General Electric Company; John
Wakeham, former U.K. Secretary of State for Energy and Leader of Houses of Lords and
Commons, director of a number of U.K. companies; and Herbert S. Winokur Jr., Chairman of

532
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to be a blue ribbon committee. 34 The minutes of the audit committee at
which the LJM transactions and Fastow's conflicts of interest were
discussed illustrate how the audit committee failed to do its duty. 35 Set
forth below is my attempt to create an agenda for the meeting to
illustrate the scope of material covered:
" Call to order 1:40 p.m.
* Approval of minutes
" Current audit matters
o Update on status (anticipate unqualified, no
disagreement with management)
o Communications required by Statement on Arbitrary
Standards #61
* Opinion on internal controls (no material weaknesses)
* Observations regarding accounting procedures (financial
reporting)
o (Enron uses highly structured transactions)
* Necessity of significant judgment regarding the foregoing
* Related party transactions
* Discussion of reserves (Causey)
* Review of LJM transactions (Causey)
o Board guidelines
o Compliance
o Supplemental procedures
o Review of each transaction
" Legal Matters (Derrick)
* Audit Committee Report for proxy statement
* Review of proposed Audit Committee charter (Causey)
* Review of 2001 Internal Audit Control Plan (Causey)
o Review of key business trends
o Overview of business risk assessment
Capricorn Holdings, Director of Penn Central (former), NATCO Group, Mrs. Fields', CCC
Information Services, and Dyn Corp. ENRON CORP., ENRON ANNUAL REPORT 2000, at 56-57
(2001), available at http://picker.uchicago.edu/Enron/EnronAnnualReport2000.pdf.
34. The Enron Audit and Compliance Committee was: Robert K. Jaedicke, Chairman,
Professor Emeritus of Accounting and Former Dean, Stanford University Graduate School of
Business; Ronnie C. Chan, Chairman, Hang Lung Group; Wendy L. Gramm, Former Chairman,
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission; John Mendelsohn, President, University of Texas
M.D. Anderson Cancer Center; Paulo V. Ferraz Pereira, Executive Vice President of Group
Bozano, Former President and CEO of State Bank of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and John Wakeham,
Former U.K. Secretary of State for Energy and Leader of the Houses of Lords and Commons. Id.

at 55-56.
35. For the full minutes, see http://flI.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/
audcomp021201 min.pdf.
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o
o

*

*
*

Key changes from prior years
Review of planned 2001 work and comparison with
years 1998-2000
o Primary areas of emphasis in 2001 (Kitchrist)
o Discussion of shared internal control with AA
Discussion of policies for management communication with
analysts (Koenig)
o Discussion of Enron investor relations group
o Discussion of Regulation FD
o Discussion of materiality
Credit & Market Update-deferred to Finance Committee
Adjourned at 3:15 p.m. until an executive session to approve
auditors the next morning from 7:50-8:00 a.m.

This looks like an impressive agenda, both in scope and detail.
Supposedly the committee reviewed each LJM transaction, as well as
the proposed audited financial statements, the proposed internal control
work, and many other items on the agenda. Now consider the LJM
transaction diagram above and the accompanying explanation. 3 6 How
long would it take you to understand that particular transaction?
Could these matters have been dealt with adequately in one hour and
twenty-five minutes? The fact that the audit committee spent so little
time on so many matters of great magnitude suggests that it was merely
going through the motions. Why would this be the case? The directors
of Enron were handsomely compensated. 37 Surely they did not intend
to deceive the public. Then why were they so supine? This Article
asserts that the directors were lulled to sleep by a lack of accountability
in the system.
Let's take a look at another corporate fiasco that has currently been in
the news involving Lord Conrad Black, Hollinger International, and
former Illinois Governor James Thompson, who was the chair of the

36. See supra notes 11-29 and accompanying text (detailing the LJM transaction).
37. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
107TH CONG., REPORT ON THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS INENRON'S COLLAPSE 56
(Comm. Print 2002).
The three experts at the May 7 hearing also criticized the compensation paid to the
Board members, noting that $350,000 per year was significantly above the norm and
that much of the compensation was in the form of stock options which enabled Board
members to benefit from stock gains, without risking any investment loss.
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Hollinger audit committee. 38 While Hollinger came to light after
Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted, the corruption involved highlighted the
recent enactments and reflected the continued indolence of corporate
directors prior to Sarbanes-Oxley.
Hollinger was another example of a supposedly blue ribbon board of
directors who failed abysmally to fulfill their responsibilities. 3 9 Lord
Black and his cronies took hundreds of millions of dollars as
management fees from Hollinger, in connection with covenants not to
compete and other ploys, such as aircraft charges, corporate apartments,
automobiles, and personal staff.40 In all, from 1997 through 2003, the
Black group received cash compensation of $362,606,165 and stock
options of $39,049,000 for a total compensation of over $400 million
The table on the following page summarizes the
dollars. 4 1
42
transactions.
The Hollinger report pointed out the failings of the Audit Committee,
particularly with regard to the "outsourcing" agreement with Ravelston,
a company of which Lord Black was the controlling shareholder.4 3 The
Hollinger report contained the following indictment of the audit
committee:
Each of the Audit Committee members acknowledged that they never
questioned the business rationale for, or fairness of, the Ravelston
"outsourcing" arrangement. They also acknowledged that they did not
develop or apply any comparisons or other metrics against which each
year's proposed fee could intelligently be measured. They never

38. Lord Black was convicted of fraud and obstruction of justice, and sentenced to 6 1/2 years
in prison. Tim Arango, Black Is Sentenced to 6 Years in Prison,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2007, at

CI.
39. The audit committee was composed of Richard Burt, who was a former U.S. ambassador
to Germany, Marie-Josre Kravis, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, and James Thompson,
the former governor of Illinois. Other board members included Raymond Chambers, the
chairman of the Amelior Foundation, Henry Kissinger, the former U.S. Secretary of State,
Richard Perle, the Former U.S. Assistant Secretary Of Defense, Robert Strauss, the former U.S.
Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Lord Weidenfeld, the chairman of Weidenfeld &
Nicholson, Ltd. RICHARD BREEDEN, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF HOLLINGER INTERNATIONAL, INC. 76 (2004).
40. Id. at 106, tbl. 3.
41. Id.
This does not include the many additional financial benefits that Hollinger's former
senior management extracted for affiliated entities, including (i) the CanWest
management and termination fees to Ravelston; (ii) the Hollinger revenue generating
assets transferred to Horizon and Bradford; (iii) the NP Holdings loss carryforwards
sold to Ravelston; and (iv) the scores of millions in below market loans to HLG.
Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 133.
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asked for any information about Ravelston: its size, scope of business,
revenues/profitability, clientele, employee list, compensation
schedules, or anything else. They never asked if the payment of
annual management fees to Ravelston was causing Hollinger to incur
costs greater than it would incur if the Company simply hired Black,
Radler and other needed Ravelston personnel directly. And they never
sought to base the annual fee on a performance component, such as a
percentage of Hollinger's EBITDA.4 4
Director Marie-Josre Kravis, a member of the audit committee, was
not aware that Black's compensation through Ravelston was set by the
audit committee. 45 According to the Hollinger Report, "Kravis'
observation that the Audit Committee didn't negotiate the management
fees appears consistent with the record, but this appears to be due to
complacency and neglect by the Committee, and not because another
committee was taking on such negotiations." 4 6 The other members of
the audit committee, and the board itself, deferred to Governor
Thompson as the chair of the committee. 47 Thompson declared that,
"his pre-Audit Committee meetings with Radler were brief, and they
were usually held over lunch or coffee." 4 8 He acknowledged that he

never asked for any analysis supporting the fee proposal, but believed
such an analysis was unnecessary "because the proposed fee never
changed much from year-to-year." 49 Thus, the committee that was
supposed to oversee the compensation arrangement deferred to the
chairman's judgment. The chairman, however, failed to fulfill his
responsibilities, and in the end the company lost hundreds of millions of
dollars.
What leads to such passivity? Part of it is structural bias. These
directors think alike and are social confreres. 50 Another part of it is a
lack of any concern for, or fear of, the consequences for a failure to
fulfill their responsibilities.
Judge Veasey of the Delaware Supreme Court, while still in private
practice, ridiculed the notion of structural bias in arguing that courts

44. Id.
45. Id. at 136.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 134.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Charles W. Murdock, Corporate Governance: The Role of Special Litigation
Committees, 68 WASH. L. REV. 79, 104-09 (1993), reprinted in 36 CORP. PRACTICE
COMMENTATOR 61 (1994-95) [hereinafter Corporate Governance] (discussing how members of
committees have biases which affect their decision making).
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should always defer to the judgment of the board of directors in the
context of special litigation committees. He stated:
Those who are chosen as outside directors of publicly held
corporations are generally persons who have distinguished themselves
in some other capacity. Chief executive officers of other corporations
seem to be especially prized as outside directors. Generally speaking,
then, outside directors tend to be men and women who have
considerable investments in reputation but who have invested most of
their human capital elsewhere. The structural bias argument asks us to
believe that outside directors generally are more willing to risk
reputation and future income than they are5 1to risk the social
embarrassment of calling a colleague to account.
I responded:
The concept of structural bias primarily recognizes the unconscious
elements of decision making. It proceeds on the basis that members of
the committee are not evil but biased. Bias is not used here in a
negative or pejorative
sense; rather it is used in the sense of inclination
52
or predisposition.
I should have added that the likelihood of risking future income is
Court decisions
quite remote, given the United States Supreme
53
litigation.
from
officers
and
insulating directors
The two examples of director dereliction in Enron and Hollinger
evidence little desire to call colleagues to account and certainly do not
inspire confidence that the board of directors will keep a watchful eye
on management. Yet the dominant thrust of judicial decisions is
essentially blind deference to boards of directors. If there is no one
looking over your shoulder, why worry?
III: SARBANES-OXLEY AND ITS KEY PROVISIONS

For a while, however, everyone was worried. The uproar over Enron
and the other corporate scandals of the period led to the enactment of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and, even more surprisingly for the George W.
Bush administration, a determination to increase the budget of the

51. Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board in Derivative Litigation:
DelawareLaw and the CurrentALl Proposals Compared, 44 BUS. LAW 503, 535 (1989).
52. See CorporateGovernance, supra note 50, at 104 (explaining structural bias as a function
of predisposition).
53. See CorporateCorruption, supra note 4, at 30-61 (documenting the Supreme Court's and
Congress' complicity in the escalation of massive corporate fraud).
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Securities and Exchange Commission to give it the manpower to curb
54
corruption.
However, it did not take long for enthusiasm for regulation to wane,
at least in the corporate management arena. By 2004, a survey of CEOs
found that a majority of them believed that overregulation was a bigger
threat to the growth of their companies than was global terrorism or
currency fluctuations! 5 5 This demonstrates both the bias and the
myopia of corporate management.
More recently, a study by
Korn/Ferry reported that over half of directors in the United States
believe that the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations should be repealed or
56
overhauled.
So what is the story? Is Sarbanes-Oxley good or evil? And, if there
are problems, does the fault lie in the legislation or in how the
legislation has been interpreted or exploited? Let us start by looking at
the legislation itself.
From the standpoint of corporate integrity and reliable financial
reporting, the key provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley are Sections 302, 404,
and 906. Section 302 requires that the principal executive officer and
the principal financial officer certify in each annual or quarterly report
filed under the securities laws that the officer has reviewed the report,
that it contains no false or misleading information, and that the financial
statements "fairly present in all material respects the financial condition
and results of operations of the issuer."5 7 In addition, the signing
officers must certify that they are responsible for establishing and
maintaining internal controls, that they have evaluated the effectiveness
of such controls, and that they have disclosed to the auditors and the
58
audit committee any problems with such controls.

54. The appropriations for the SEC increased every year from $356,074,000 in fiscal year
1999 to $904,846,000 (requested) in fiscal year 2007. SEC ANNUAL REPORT 208 (1999); SEC
ANNUAL REPORT (2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/annrep.shtml.
55. Floyd Norris, Too Much Regulation? Corporate Bosses Sing the Sarbanes-Oxley Blues,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2004, at C1.
A survey of global chief executives released by PricewaterhouseCoopers at the World
Economic Forum found that 59 percent viewed overregulation as a significant risk or,
worse, one of the biggest threats to the growth of their companies-far more than
viewed global terrorism or currency fluctuations as posing major risks.
Id.
56. Press Release, Korn/Ferry International, Majority of Board Directors Feel Sarbanes-Oxley
Regulations Should Be Repealed or Overhauled (Feb. 23, 2006), available at
http://www.kornferry.com/Library/Process.asp?P=PRDetail&CD=l 419&LID=l.
57. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241(a)(3) (West Supp. 2006).
58. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7241(a)(4), (5) (West Supp. 2006).
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Section 906 put some teeth in the requirement that the CEO and CFO
certify that the financials fairly present the condition and operations of
the company.
The Section provides criminal penalties and
imprisonment if an officer knowingly or willfully certifies false
59
information.
Section 404 requires that each annual report filed by a reporting
company must contain the report on internal controls, which sets forth
the responsibility of management to establish and maintain such
controls, as well as an assessment of their ineffectiveness. 60 In addition,
the auditor for the company is required to attest to and report on the
61
assessment made by management.
This Part focuses on objections to Sarbanes-Oxley. It first looks at
the criticism directed towards Section 302 of the Act and demonstrates
that its requirements are, in fact, reasonable. It then examines the
impact Section 302 has had on recent litigation. Next, this Part deals
with Section 404, the more controversial section of Sarbanes-Oxley. It
discusses the initial expectations regarding the impact of Section 404.
A. Section 302: Management Certificationof Financials
While much of the rancor directed towards Sarbanes-Oxley has
focused upon Section 404, dealing with management's responsibility for
internal controls, Section 302 has also been criticized for allegedly
expanding the net of liability. In railing against overregulation, the
McKinsey Report, commissioned by Mayor Michael Bloomberg of
New York City and New York Senator Charles Schumer, characterized
the U.S. legal system as punitive, stating:
[L]iability is not limited to corporate entities but also extends to
individuals, even if they are only remotely involved in the US
markets. For example, Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
specifically imposes personal liability on corporate executives for
failing to comply with the act. The recent extraterritorial application
of other US statutes
has made even clearer the personal threat that US
62
laws can present.

59. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1350(c) (West Supp. 2006).
60. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262(a) (West Supp. 2006). See infra text accompanying note 95 for the
full text of this Section.
61. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262(b) (West Supp. 2006).
62. MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, CITY OF NEW YORK AND U.S.
SENATE, SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE U.S.' GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP

76-77 (2007), available at http://www.senate.gov/-schumer/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/
special-reports/2007/NYREPORT%20_FINAL.pdf
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So how great is this threat? What do we expect from CEOs and
CFOs with respect to the financial statements that their company
promulgates to the public? Is it satisfactory for someone like Jeffrey
Skilling, CEO of Enron, to be able to disclaim any knowledge of what
63
was going on in his company?
In order to assess how reasonable or unreasonable the provisions of
Section 302 are, it might be helpful to look at the regulations
promulgated pursuant to Section 302, which set forth the certification
that the officers are required to give. 64 But rather than look at the
certification itself, let's look at its negative. In other words, what would
the antithesis of the required certification look like? I suggest it might
look something like this:
I, [identify the certifying individual], certify that:
1. I have [not] reviewed this [specify report] of [identify
registrant];
2. Based on my knowledge, this report [may] does-net contain
any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light
of the circumstances under which such statements were made,
not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in this report, [may or may
not; I really don't know] fairly present in all material respects
the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of
the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
report;
4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are [not]
responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure
controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial
reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and
15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:
a. [Not] Designed such disclosure controls and
procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to

63. The Financial Collapse of Enron-Part2: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
and Investigationsof the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 91 (2002) (testimony
of Jeffrey K. Skilling, CEO, Enron).
64. To get to the actual language which the certification must follow requires a bit of mental
gymnastics. You first need to go to Rule 13a-14, which will send you to form 10-K, Item 15,
which will then take you to Item 601 of Regulation S-K. 17 CFR § 229.601.
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ensure that material information relating to the
registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is
made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is
being prepared;
b. [Not] Designed such internal control over financial
reporting, or caused such internal control over
financial reporting to be designed under our
supervision, to provide reasonable assurance
regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the
preparation of financial statements for external
purposes in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles;
c. [Not] Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's
disclosure controls and procedures and [we have no]
our conclusions about the
p..nted in this r.pt
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and
procedures, as of the end of the period covered by
this report based on such evaluation; and
d. [Not] Disclosed in this report any change in the
registrant's internal control over financial reporting
that occurred during the registrant's most recent
fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in
the case of an annual report) that has materially
affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect,
the registrant's internal control over financial
reporting; and
The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have
disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal
control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors
and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent functions):
a. [We have no idea whether there are] A14 significant
deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting
which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the
registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and
report financial information; and
b. [We have no idea whether there has been] Any
fraud, whether or not material, that involves
management or other employees who have a

542
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internal control
significant role in the 6registrant's
5
over financial reporting.
If management of a company filed the foregoing certification, would

anyone buy stock in such a company?

Why then cannot corporate

management assert the positive, since the negative is unacceptable?
Do we not expect management to review the financial statements it
promulgates to the public? Note that the certification speaks only about

what management knows, not what management should have known. If
there are material misstatements or omissions known to management,
would we not expect them to be corrected or disclosed?

Does not

management have a responsibility to maintain internal controls and
should not these controls be such that they ensure that material
information is brought to the attention of senior management? And
should not management be interested in whether or not the controls are
working? Why have controls if they are not effective? If there are
significant deficiencies or material weaknesses, should not the auditors
and the audit committee be informed?
One reason that management does not like these provisions is that, at

least with respect to financial statements, management cannot escape
responsibility for financial statements by employing the requirement in
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA") that a plaintiff
plead misstatements and scienter with particularity. 66 PSLRA placed a

65. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (§ 302 codified at 15
U.S.C.A. § 7241 (West Supp. 2006)) (changes by author).
66. With respect to pleading with particularity, Section 21D(b)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(l)
provides as follows:
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff alleges that the
defendant:
(a) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
(b) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading;
the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason
or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the
statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2000). In addition, with respect to scienter, Section 21D, 15 U.S.C.A. §
78u-4(b)(2) provides as follows:
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff may recover
money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind,
the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter,
state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000).
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huge obstacle in the way of securities fraud plaintiffs by requiring
specific, particular details of the alleged fraud to be in the complaint in
68
order for the suit to proceed 6 7-without the benefit of discovery.
Section 302 facilitates the particularity requirement for certain
situations. It identifies for potential liability particular persons, who
make particular representations, based upon particular actions.
In re OCA, Inc. Securities and Derivative Litigation69 illustrates the
impact that the Section 302 certification can have on the outcome of
litigation. In the OCA case, the CEO, CFO, and COO were sued on the
basis that they had misled investors by overstating the company's
assets, which were in the form of patient receivables, and concealing
70
material shortcomings in the company's internal controls.
Paradoxically, the company was in the business of providing financial,
operational, marketing, management, and other business services to
dental practices. 7 1 The situation was akin to the cobbler's children
having no shoes.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs relied heavily upon the Section 302
certifications in three quarterly reports and upon three confidential
witnesses. In all the quarterly reports, the CEO and CFO certified that
the financial reports fairly presented the company's condition. In the
first quarterly report in question (May 20, 2004), they certified that
they:
(i) had designed or caused to be designed "disclosure controls and
procedures" to ensure that they were made aware of material
information relating to the company; (ii) had evaluated the
effectiveness of OCA's disclosure controls and presented in the
quarterly report their conclusions about the effectiveness of those
disclosure controls; (iii) had disclosed any material change in the
company's internal controls over financial reporting that occurred
67. See Harris v. Ivax, 182 F.3d 799, 803 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting the PSLRA's heightened
pleading standard, which requires specific facts sufficient to create a strong inference as to the
state of mind of the officers involved in submitting the allegedly fraudulent statement); In re
Midway Games, 332 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1155 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (describing the purpose of the
PSLRA to discourage claims of "fraud by hindsight"); In re Spectrum Brands, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
461 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1306 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (noting that the PSLRA contemplates pleadings
which allege facts concerning the time, place, and contents of the alleged fraudulent actions rather
than conclusory allegations); In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 984 (9th Cir.
1999) (holding that the plaintiff failed to meet the requirements where his allegations merely
"suggested" an inference of deliberate recklessness, but failed to document the contents of the
alleged fraudulent reports or the persons who wrote and reviewed those reports).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iv)(2000).
69. No. 05-2165, 2006 WL 3747560 (E.D. La. Dec. 14, 2006).
70. Id. at "1-2.
71. Id.at*l.
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during the most recent fiscal quarter; and (iv) had disclosed to OCA's
auditors and its audit committee any significant deficiencies or
material weaknesses in the company's internal financial reporting
controls and any fraud, whether or not material, involving
management or other employees who have a 72significant role in the
company's internal financial reporting controls.
The quarterly report also reported in a cursory manner that Ernst &
Young, the auditors, had identified a number of material weaknesses in
the company's internal controls, but that the company was taking a
73
number of steps to improve its controls.
The company later terminated Ernst & Young and engaged
PricewaterhouseCoopers as the successor auditor. 74 On June 7, 2005,
the company announced that it would further delay its 2004 annual
report and that it had determined that it had materially overstated its
reported patient receivables for each of the first three quarters. 75 The
company also announced that the Board of Directors had appointed a
special committee to investigate allegations that altered data had been
provided to the company's auditor.7 6 In the wake of this announcement,
the stock of the company fell by more than 38%, and
PricewaterhouseCoopers resigned five months later. 77 Later, OCA went
78
into bankruptcy.
In their motion to dismiss, defendants argued, first, that the plaintiffs
had not alleged any actionable false statements by them and, second,
that plaintiffs had not alleged acts sufficient to establish a strong
inference of scienter. 79 The court dismissed the claim against the COO
because he had not signed any of the public filings with the SEC and
had not been involved in any of the press releases. 80 However, the court
72. Id. at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Id. The weaknesses included:
(i) increased automation in determining patient revenue and patient receivables; and
(ii) steps to improve communication between operations and financial accounting, such
as appointing a CFO with operations experience and forming a committee with
representatives from the operations, financial accounting, and legal departments to
discuss and assess pending litigation. The company also stated that it intended to hire
additional financial accounting staff and to engage outside consultants to advise
management on additional improvements to internal controls.
Id.
74. Id. at *2.
75. Id. at *6.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *7.
78. Id.
79. Id. at *10.
80. Id. at *12.
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noted that the CEO and CFO had each signed the certifications. Since
the company had acknowledged in its June 7 communication that
patient receivables were overstated by material amounts, the court
determined that plaintiffs had adequately pleaded misleading statements
by the two senior officers. 8 1 Under PSLRA, and prior to SarbanesOxley, the action probably would have been dismissed.
The existence of these Section 302 certifications also helped
plaintiffs meet their burden to plead scienter with particularity. The
court stated:
[A]llegations of the following circumstances, when considered
together, are sufficient to raise a strong inference of scienter as to
Palmisano, Sr. [the CEO] and Verret [the CFO]: (1) the importance of
OCA's patient receivables asset; (2) the severity of OCA's internal
control problems; (3) the relationship of the internal control problems
to the overstatements of the patient receivables asset; and (4) the
Sarbanes-Oxley
certifications executed by Palmisano, Sr. and
82
Verret.
Further supporting the plaintiffs' claims, confidential witnesses had
testified to numerous complaints from patients that their payments had
not been credited against their balances owed and that these problems
were brought to the attention of their superiors. 83 In addition, the CEO,
who was a certified public accountant, had helped to develop the
company's accounting systems. 84 The court took this all into account
when deciding whether the plaintiffs had adequately alleged an
inference of scienter.
In so deciding, the court reviewed various commentators discussing
how the Section 302 certification can help a plaintiff establish
scienter. 85 The commentators argued that if a corporate officer certifies
the company's financial reports, and later the company reveals that the
reports contained material false statements, a plaintiff could establish
that the officer knew about the false statements or was reckless in not
knowing about the false statements in one of two ways. 86 First, the
company's disclosure controls, mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley and
certified as effective in the Section 302 certification, would have alerted
the officer to the false statements. 87 Second, if the disclosure controls
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at *12.
Id. at *17.
ld. at *18.
Id.
Id. at*21.
Id.
Id. at *22.
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were inadequate, then the officer knew they were inadequate or was
reckless in not knowing. 88 Either way, based on the Section 302
certification, the officer could be charged with the requisite state of
89
mind at the pleading stage.
However, the court declined to hold that a Sarbanes-Oxley
certification, "without more," would support a strong inference of
scienter. 90 It did conclude, however, that in this case, the "something
more" was present. The certifications, coupled with the substantial
problems with receivables and the failure to respond to the serious
control problems, could support an inference of scienter. 9 1 The court
focused on the fact that the officers certified that they had designed and
92
evaluated the internal controls and that those controls were effective.
Moreover, the officers also certified that they had disclosed all
significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the internal control
system to the auditors and the company's audit committee. 9 3 However,
in connection with its resignation, PricewaterhouseCoopers had
reported that the company had not responded to the serious accounting
problems, but rather had submitted altered
irregularities and control
94
auditors.
the
to
records
The OCA case demonstrates the potential impact of a Section 302
certification on the outcome of securities litigation-absent the officers'
certification of financial reports in that case, the defendant's motion to
dismiss probably would have been granted, allowing the defendants to
escape liability easily.
B. Section 404: Management Assessment of Internal Controls and
Auditor Attestation of Such Assessment.
Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley has generated the most controversy
because of the incredible costs involved in complying with it. Calls for
its modification or repeal have reached a crescendo. Before reviewing
the complaints about Section 404, let us first look at the language of the
provision:

88. Id. at *22.
89. Id. at *21.
90. Id. at *22.
91. Id.
92. Id. In two of the quarterly reports, these certifications had waffled about the effectiveness
of internal controls, but the court stated that such "doubletalk" itself reflected a conscious evasion
of the truth. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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SEC. 404. MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT OF INTERNAL
CONTROLS.
(a) RULES REQUIRED.-The Commission shall prescribe rules
requiring each annual report required by . . . the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ... to contain an internal control report,
which shall-

(1) state the responsibility of management for establishing
and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and

procedures for financial reporting; and
(2) contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent
fiscal year of the issuer, of the effectiveness of the internal

control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial
reporting.
(b)
INTERNAL
CONTROL
EVALUATION
AND
REPORTING.-With respect to the internal control assessment
required by subsection (a), each registered public accounting firm
that prepares or issues the audit report for the issuer shall attest to,
and report on, the assessment made by the management of the
issuer. An attestation made under this subsection shall be made in
accordance with standards for attestation engagements issued or
adopted by the Board. Any such attestation shall not be the
95
subject of a separate engagement.

On its face, the provision does not appear terribly earthshaking.
Management has long been required to put a system of internal controls
in place. 9 6 All Section 404 would seem to require is that management
95. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. 2006)).
96. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, enacted in 1977, added section 13(b)(2), 15 U.S.C.A.
§78m (b) (2), to the 1934 Act. The relevant material provides as follows:
(2) Every issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 781 of
this title and every issuer which is required to file reports pursuant to section 78o(d) of
this title shall(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail,
accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the
issuer;
(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to
provide reasonable assurances that(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's general or
specific authorization;
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (1) to permit preparation of
financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to
maintain accountability for assets;
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's
general or specific authorization; and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing
assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to
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acknowledge its responsibility for establishing an internal control
system and assess its effectiveness. 97 In addition, the auditors are then
required to attest to and report on such assessment.
Congress certainly did not believe that Section 404 would be a major
problem. The committee report stated:
[T]he Committee does not intend that the auditor's evaluation be the
subject of a separate engagement or the basis for increased charges or
fees. High quality audits typically incorporate extensive internal
control testing. The Committee intends that the auditor's assessment
of the issuer's system of internal controls should be considered to be a
of the auditor and an integral part of the audit
core responsibility
98
report.

Furthermore, in the SEC's release adopting the internal control rules,
the SEC estimated that the average annual cost to public companies
over the initial three years of compliance would be $91,000 and that
there would be "a direct correlation between the extent of the burden
and the size of the reporting company, with the burden increasing
99
commensurate with the size of the company."
Unfortunately, history has demonstrated that the SEC expectations
did not accord with experience.
IV. WHAT WENT WRONG WITH SARBANES-OXLEY?

The cost of compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley has gone through the
roof. A Korn/Ferry study in 2004 reported an average implementation
cost of $5.1 million. 10 0 The next year, Deborah Solomon from the Wall
Street Journal reported that compliance for an individual company can

any differences.
Furthermore, Section 302 establishes the requirement that management have a system of internal
control. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302. The signing officers must create such a system that
"material information is ... made known to such officers ...." Id. In addition, Section 302
requires that management evaluate the effectiveness of the control system, report their
conclusions, and disclose to the auditors and the audit committee "significant deficiencies" and
"material weaknesses" in the system. Id. Like Section 404, on its face, this appears to be a rather
ordinary course type responsibility.
97. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404, 15 U.S.C.A. 7262 (West. Supp. 2006).
98. S. REP. No. 107-205, at 31 (2002).
99. Management's Report on Internal Control, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8238, 68 Fed.
Reg. 36,636, 36,655 (June 18, 2003).
100. Press Release, Korn/Ferry International, Price of Regulatory Compliance Skyrockets,
According to Board Directors Worldwide (Nov. 22, 2004 ), http://www.kornferry.com/library/
Process.asp?P=PR Detail&CID=840&LID=l; see also John Berlau, A Tremendously Costly
Law: Sarbanes-Oxley, Three Years After its Unfortunate Passage, NAT'L REV., Apr. 11, 2005, at
39 (positing that the costs to businesses of implementing Sarbanes-Oxley has caused a decline in
productivity, new jobs, and innovation in the general business world).
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range from a few hundred thousand dollars to more than $8 million,
depending on the company's size. 10 1 However, the most serious impact
has been on smaller companies. The Final Report of the Advisory
Committee on Smaller Public Companies reported that, for companies
with a market capitalization between $75 million and $700 million,
second-year implementation costs will average approximately
$900,000.102

The chart below 10 3 shows implementation costs as a percentage of
revenue for companies with different market capitalizations and
demonstrates the greater impact of implementation costs on smaller
companies.
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Source: American Electronics Association (AcA) Report entitled Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404, The
Section of Unintended Consequences andIts Impact on Small Business (Feb.2005).

How is it that reality could be so different from expectations?

101. Deborah Solomon, Critics Say Sarbanes-Oxley's Costs Are Too High, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE Now, Oct. 17, 2005, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/O5290/590143.stm.
102. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES, SEC, FINAL REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES TO UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND

EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 32-33 (2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/
acspc-finalreport.pdf (last visited March 8, 2008) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT].
103. Id. at 33.
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Last year, a majority of directors surveyed believed that SarbanesOxley should be repealed or overhauled. 10 4 However, the problem is
not with the statute, but rather with its implementation. The SEC's
Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies ("Advisory
Committee") has noted that "[t]here [has] been little attempt to tailor, or
'scale,' regulation to address the manner in which smaller companies
operate."' 10 5 In other words, those in the accounting industry essentially
adopted a "one-size-fits-all" approach to fulfilling their responsibilities
to attest to and report on management's assessment of its internal
controls. 10 6 As a result of testimony adduced at its hearings, the
Advisory Committee concluded that "implementation of AS2 has
resulted in very rigid, prescriptive audits as a result of onerous AS2
07
requirements."1
In addition, the scope of auditor review has gone far beyond what is
necessary to ensure the integrity of financial reporting. As one chief
financial officer pointed out:
Currently, companies are documenting, testing and auditing nearly
all business processes and their related controls. However, the act was
intended to focus solely on controls over financial reporting. The
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board and the audit industry
have interpreted the act very broadly, to include nearly every activity
within the company.
For example, companies are required to document, test and audit
their controls over the hiring process, personnel reviews and executive
management meetings/minutes. These areas have little or no
relationship to the company's financial statements. This broadening of
the scope of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is why the effort and cost has
been so much larger than anticipated. 108
The absurdity of the implementation of Section 404 is documented in
commentary and testimony sought by the Advisory Committee. One
respondent stated:
We have been forced to identify 2500 controls for a company with
only 12-15 job categories. To measure the risks involved (700 in our
104. Press Release, Korn/Ferry International, Majority of Board Directors Feel SarbanesOxley Regulations Should be Repealed or Overhauled (Feb. 23, 2006), http://www.kornferry
.com/Library/Process.asp?P=PR_Detail&CID=1419&LID=1.
105. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 102, at 31.
106. Id. at 32.
107. Id.
108. David Sanakaran, Ask the Experts: CFOs Balancing Act, SMALL TIMES, June 8, 2005,
availableat http://www.smalltimes.com/articles/article-display.cfm?ARTICLElD=
270093&p=109.
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case), categorize them and design and document that many controls is
completely unmanageable. That is 200 controls per job type. This is
an auditor's dream, but just a dream. It is not function[al], practical or
useful. 109

Consider also the prepared statement of Donald S. Perkins, the
chairman of Nanophase Technologies, addressed to the Advisory
Committee.1 10 Nanophase is a corporation that had total revenues of
In 2005, its three largest
approximately $5.2 million in 2004. i "
customers accounted for approximately 83% of the company's
revenue. 112 The company has a market capitalization of $120 million,
but only fifty-three employees, 113 three of whom are professionals in
finance and accounting. 114 According to Mr. Perkins, in 2004 the
company spent $259,000 and over a thousand hours on Section 404
The Sarbanes-Oxley expenses amounted to
compliance.1 5
approximately 5% of sales. 116 Perkins explained why this kind of effort
was absurd for his company:
In an environment as small as ours, redundant controls are inherently
inefficient if not impossible. The CFO signs every check and
approves every purchase order in excess of fifteen hundred dollars.
The CEO signs every check over ten thousand dollars and approves
every purchase order over five thousand. I or another board member
signs off on any purchase of equipment which would be in this case
250 thousand dollars or more. We have a total of seven people
responsible for the administration of the small company, but we may
need to add somebody 1if17 we are to follow the pressures brought on to
us by Sarbanes-Oxley.
The CFO of the company testified that, while the process may have
had some advantages, "it was kind of swatting flies with a

109. SEC, Responses to ACSPC Request for Public Input, question 10, identified as
08/03/2005 01:39:17, available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smalIbus/acspc/acspc-rpcIO.htm
[hereinafter Responses to ACSPC Request].
110. DONALD S. PERKINS, STATEMENT TO SEC ADVISORY COMMITTEE (Aug. 9, 2005),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/265-23/dsperkinsO80905.pdf.
111. Nanophase Technologies Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-6 (Mar. 14, 2005)
(Form 10-K), availableat http://www.nanophase.com/pdf/NanophaseAnnualReport_2005.pdf.
112. Id. at F-23.
113. Id. at 9.
114. RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES,
SEC, at 81 (Aug. 9, 2005) (statement of Donald S. Perkins, Chairman of the Board of Directors of
Nanophase Technologies Corp.), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/
acspctranscript080905.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
115. Id.at8l,87.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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sledgehammer.""11 8 In a company of the size and complexity of
Nanophase, it would be cheaper to hire retired FBI agents to sit on the
shoulders of the three accounting professionals than to go through the
expense to which the company was subjected.
As Enron, WorldCom, and other major scandals indicated, massive
fraud is not possible without corruption at the top. In any company, the
danger always exists for management to override the controls in place.
Thus, in effect, one of the most important internal controls is to protect
120
whistleblowers 119 with a strong whistleblower policy.
Some of the outlandish costs associated with Section 404 compliance
are not a problem of government regulation, but rather a problem within
the business community; namely, the accounting profession. One
respondent to the Advisory Committee commented about the lack of
control his company had with respect to using appropriate judgment in
determining which areas were high risk or low risk:
How to categorize this lies not in the hands of our company or the
SEC, but in the hands of our CPAs, who are by nature going to
erro[rs] on the side of being excessively cautious right now to avoid
the potential of being the next Arthur Andersen. No one knows our
risks better than we do, yet a third party that comes on site for two or
three weeks a year has all the power to tell us that lower level risk
items require treatment as high risk areas .... 121
An article in the National Review was even more critical of the
accounting profession. In commenting upon an ad in the Wall Street
Journal supporting Sarbanes-Oxley, the author stated:
The expensive ad was not paid for by a pension fund or another group
representing the investors the law was intended to serve: Its sponsor
was, rather, PricewaterhouseCoopers, the multi-billion-dollar
accounting firm making a bundle in fees for doing all the audits the
law has ended up requiring of business. By creating so many hurdles
for public companies, the law has birthed a golden goose for those
who audit them. And ironically, despite the media and legislative
clamor to "get" the big accounting firms after Enron imploded, it's the

118. Id. at 81 (statement of Jess Jankowski, Chief Financial Officer of Nanophase
Technologies Corp.).
119. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (West. Supp. 2006)
(discussing whistleblower protections for employees).
120. The whistleblower policy of Nanophase is an excellent example.
Nanophase
Technologies Corp. Whistleblower Policy, http://www.nanophase.com/investorrelations/
whistleblower.asp.
121. Responses to ACSPC Request, supra note 109, at question 10, identified as 08/16/2005
13:19:29.
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Big Four accounting firms
that have turned out to be the big winners
12 2
from Sarbanes-Oxley.

Hopefully, both the furor over the excessive expense and the "cover
your back" approach of the accounting profession will be moderated
now that the SEC has published Interpretive Guidance ("Guidance")
regarding management's evaluation of internal control. 123 The SEC
also published amendments to its rules ("Amendments") to clarify that a
company in compliance with the interpretive guidance will satisfy
management's evaluation requirement.124 The Amendments defined the
term "material weakness" and revised the requirements for the auditor's
attestation report. 125
These changes were intended to make
management and auditors' evaluations of internal control over financial
126
reporting more effective and efficient.
The SEC's Guidance is organized around two main principles, which
seem to respond to many of the objections surrounding the accounting
122. Berlau, supra note 100, at 39.
123. Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting, Exchange Act
Release No. 33-8762 & No. 34-54,976, 71 Fed. Reg. 77,635, 77,635 (Dec. 27, 2006) [hereinafter
Interpretive Guidance]. The Release set forth the following summary:
We are proposing interpretive guidance for management regarding its evaluation of
internal control over financial reporting. The interpretive guidance sets forth an
approach by which management can conduct a top-down, risk-based evaluation of
internal control over financial reporting. The proposed guidance is intended to assist
companies of all sizes to complete their annual evaluation in an effective and efficient
manner and it provides guidance on a number of areas commonly cited as concerns
over the past two years. In addition, we are proposing an amendment to our rules
requiring management's annual evaluation of internal control over financial reporting
to make it clear that an evaluation that complies with the interpretive guidance is one
way to satisfy those rules. Further, we are proposing an amendment to our rules to
revise the requirements regarding the auditor's attestation report on the assessment of
internal control over financial reporting.
Id.
124. Id.
125. Amendments to Rules Regarding Management's Report on Internal Control Over
Financial Reporting, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8809 & No. 34-55928, 72 Fed. Reg. 35,310,
35,313 (June 27, 2007) [hereinafter Amendments to Rules]. The Release summarizes its effect as
follows:
We are adopting an amendment to our rules to clarify that an evaluation which
complies with the Commission's interpretive guidance published in this issue of the
Federal Register in Release No. 34-55,929 is one way to satisfy the requirement for
management to evaluate the effectiveness of the issuer's internal control over financial
reporting. We are also amending our rules to define the term material weakness and to
revise the requirements regarding the auditor's attestation report on the effectiveness of
internal control over financial reporting. The amendments are intended to facilitate
more effective and efficient evaluations of internal control over financial reporting by
management and auditors.
Id. at 35,310.
126. Id.
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profession's current approach to auditing a company.' 2 7 The first
principle focuses on allowing management, not accountants, to
determine what risks exist for a material misstatement in financial
records and the seriousness of the risk. 128 The Guidance suggests a
process for evaluating risks, which uses "a top-down, risk-based
approach," designed to encourage efficiency.1 29 The Guidance does not
require management to identify every control in a process; thus,
management can focus on those that it believes are adequate to control
the risk of a material misstatement. 130 "[I]f management determines
that the risks for a particular financial reporting element are adequately
addressed by an entity-level control, no further evaluation of other
controls is required." 13'
The second organizational principle uses management's assessment
of risk to determine the extensiveness of the controls and evaluations in
each area. 13 2 This allows management to focus more on the areas it
determines are high risk for inaccuracies, thus conserving resources in
areas that pose less of a threat. 13 3 As a result, "companies of all sizes
and complexities will be able to implement [the] rules effectively and
34
efficiently." 1
According to the SEC's Amendments, it intended that the Guidance
would "significantly lessen" pressure on management to rely heavily on
auditing standards in conducting its evaluation of internal controls over
financial reporting. 135 Those auditing standards had resulted in
excessive testing and documentation, which greatly increased the cost
of implementing Sarbanes-Oxley. 136 Thus, the Guidance should assist
management in avoiding excessive costs and in determining how best to
evaluate its internal controls. 13 7 The Amendments stated:
Through the risk and control identification process, management will
have identified for testing only those controls that are needed to meet
the objective of [internal control over financial reporting] (that is, to
provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

InterpretativeGuidance, supra note 123, at 77,635-36.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 77,639.
Id.
Id. at 77,632.
Id.
Id. at 77,639.
Amendments to Rules, supra note 125, at 35,316.
Id.
Id.
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reporting) and for which evidence about their operation can be
obtained most efficiently. The nature and extent of procedures
implemented to evaluate whether those controls continue to operate
effectively can be tailored to the company's unique
circumstances,
13 8
thereby avoiding unnecessary compliance costs.
The Amendments also defined "material weakness" as a deficiency,
or a combination of deficiencies, in internal controls such that "there is
a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the registrant's
annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected
on a timely basis."' 139 The use of "reasonable possibility" in effect is an
intermediate approach between "more than remote" and "reasonable
likelihood." Finally, the Amendments determined that the company's
auditor must only express one opinion on the company's internal
controls. This would be a direct opinion on the effectiveness of such
controls. 140 Prior to the amendments, letters expressed two separate
opinions: one on the effectiveness of a company's controls and another
on management's assessment of such effectiveness.
These policy pronouncements would seem to respond to the concerns
previously discussed.
V. THE BENEFITS OF SARBANES-OXLEY

While much criticism has been directed at Sarbanes-Oxley, there is
substantial data to indicate that there have also been significant benefits.
Some of the benefits are arguably quantifiable, but others, such as a
14 1
change in tone at the top levels of management, are more amorphous.
One clear trend is that, immediately following the enactment of
Sarbanes-Oxley, there was a dramatic increase in the number of
financial restatements filed by public companies.
This trend is
illustrated by the graph on the following page:
138. Id.
139. Id. at35,313.
140. Id. at35,315.
141. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC MARKETS REGULATION (2006) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT]. The
Interim Report stated:
Critics stress high compliance costs-which totaled an estimated $15-20 billion for
issuers in 2004-while supporters emphasize the intangible, or indirect, benefits from
Section 404 implementation. In particular, supporters note a changed 'tone at the top'
among public companies when it comes to financial reporting, with a higher level of
engagement from audit committees, CEOs, and CFOs on accounting issues. They also
note that many of the control weaknesses uncovered in the early years of Section 404
implementation have led to significant improvements in the control environment.
Id. at 115-16. The Committee on Public Markets Regulation is an independent, bipartisan
committee composed of twenty-two top corporate and financial leaders. Id. at vii.
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(RE)STATING THE CASE
The rapid rise in filings by U.S. public companies
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Source: Say Again?, CFO MAGAZINE, Apr. 2007, Glass, Lewis & Co. (2003-6)
and Huron Consulting (1997-2002)

In discussing the upsurge in restatements in 2003 and 2004, a report
by the Huron Consulting Group (the "Huron Report") opined:
The intense focus brought by Section 404 and its requirements for the
management of public registrants to thoroughly document, test and
take responsibility for the effectiveness of their company's safeguards
for quality financial reporting has resulted in an unprecedented period
of scrutiny on how registrants produce financial results for
investors. 142
The Huron Report also noted that 15% of the 2004 restatements were
by "repeat filers" who had reported erroneous information on more than
one occasion since 1997.143 In addition, the number of companies
reporting errors in at least three of the prior annual periods rose to
nearly 40%.144 If a company files restatements for multiple periods,
that suggests the company has "flawed accounting policies, practices
and errors occurring over a period of time, as opposed to one-time
errors." 14 5 Thus, Sarbanes-Oxley has brought increased attention to the

142. Press Release, Huron Consulting Group, New Report by Huron Consulting Group
Reveals Financial Restatements Increased at Record Level in 2004 (January 20, 2005), available
at http://www.huronconsultinggroup.com/article.aspx?articleld= 143.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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way in which companies conduct their accounting, forcing necessary
changes that might have otherwise gone unnoticed.
The Business Roundtable even acknowledged that Sarbanes-Oxley
has done some good. Thomas Lehmer, a spokesman for the Business
Roundtable, stated, "There is without question greater accountability in
the board room . . . . In the minds of the investing public, [the
Sarbanes-Oxley requirements] are important safeguards, and I think
they are."' 146 Officials at a publicly traded company that spent $2.5
million and 10,000 hours of employee time opined that the costs were
excessive, but acknowledged that the company was now a better-run
business. 147
They stated, "[d]irectors meet more often without
executives present. Multiple ombudsmen field employee complaints.
Ethics training is more rigorous."' 14 8 The CEO of the company now
requires his lieutenants to take more responsibility for their results and
concluded, "[I]nvestors are better protected because Sarbanes-Oxley
149
regulations have been put in place."'
The Interim Report attempted to conduct a quantitative analysis of
whether the benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley outweigh the costs. 150 It used
two approaches. One was based on a 2006 GAO study that analyzed
the market responses to announcements of a financial restatement by
comparing the stock price the day before the announcement with the
stock price at a point in time thereafter. 15 1 The Interim Report
concluded that the benefits approximate cost. 15 2 However, it may have
understated the benefits because it used the price from the day before
the restatement was announced, whereas companies may have
announced an intent to restate at a previous point in time. In addition,
the news may well have leaked into the market.
The second approach was to use a cost of capital analysis based on
two different studies that examined the impact of disclosure by firms
that reported internal control deficiencies. 153 One study found a
Sarbanes-Oxley benefit to be $85-255 billion, whereas another study

146.
J., July
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Joan S. Lublin & Kara Scannel, Critics See Some Good from Sarbanes-Oxley, WALL ST.
30, 2007, at B 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 141, at 118-30.
Id. at 120-24
Id. at 120-26.
Id. at 124-25.
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found no impact on cost of capital. 15 4 These latter two analyses seem
contradictory and inconclusive at best.
In addition to the restatement data, there is compelling evidence that
companies have been manipulating earnings, something that is less
likely after Sarbanes-Oxley began requiring top management
certification. Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt spotlighted this
problem during his tenure. He stated that "we are witnessing an erosion
in the quality of earnings, and therefore, the quality of financial
reporting. Managing may be giving way to manipulation; integrity may
be losing out to illusion."' 15 5 Given the frequency with which Chairman
Levitt raised this issue, the problem could hardly be a surprise to

anyone.
Chairman Levitt focused on five of what he considered the "more
popular" techniques to manufacture earnings. 156 The first was the "Big

Bath" restructuring charges in which a company overstates the charges

154. Id. at 124.
155. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, The "Numbers Game," Remarks at the N.Y.U. Center for
Law and Business (Sept. 28, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speechlspeecharchive/
1998/spch220.txt [hereinafter Levitt, The "Numbers Game"]. The theme of declining integrity in
financial reporting has been repeated on many occasions. See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, Chairman,
SEC, A Financial Partnership, Remarks Before the Consumer Federation of America (Nov. 16,
1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch227.htm; Arthur
Levitt, Chairman, SEC, Partnership for Public Trusts, Remarks at the American Institution of
Certified Public Accountants (Dec. 8, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
speecharchive/1998/spch230.txt; Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, Keeping the Faith with the
Shareholder Interest: Strengthening the Role of Independent Directors of Mutual Funds, Remarks
at Mutual Funds and Investment Management Conference (Mar. 22, 1999), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch261.txt; Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC,
In the Best Interests and Beneficiaries: Trust and Public Funds, Remarks at the 1999 Annual
Meeting of the Council of Institutional Investors (Mar. 30, 1999), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/l1999/spch263.htm;
Arthur Levitt, Chairman,
SEC, Remarks to Committee of Economic Development of New York (May 19, 1999), available
at http:/www.sec.gov/news/speechlspeecharchive/1999/spch278.htm; Arthur Levitt, Chairman,
SEC, An Essential Next Step in the Evolution of Corporate Governance, Remarks at the Audit
Committee Symposium (June 29, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speechl
speecharchive/1999/spch289.htm; Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, Corporate Governance in
Global America, Remarks to the American Council on Germany (Oct. 7, 1999), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/l1999/spch302.htm;
Arthur Levitt, Chairman,
SEC, Quality Information: The Lifeblood of Our Markets, Remarks at the Economic Club of New
York (Oct. 18, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/
spch304.htm; Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, Remarks at the Economic Club of Washington
(Apr. 6, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speechlspch362.htm; Arthur Levitt,
Chairman, SEC, The Public's Profession, Remarks at the Fall Council of the American Institution
of Certified Public Accountants (Oct. 24, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch4lO.htm.
156. Levitt, The "Numbers Game," supra note 155 (characterizing all five as accounting
"gimmicks").
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so that earnings will take a one-time hit; later, those charges are
converted into earnings when the charges turn out to be less than
reserved against. 15 7 The second was "creative acquisition accounting"
in which companies classify part of the acquisition price as in process
research and development so the amount can be written off in a onetime charge. 158 The third is the "Cookie Jar" reserve approach, which
involves utilizing unrealistic assumptions to estimate liabilities for such
items as sales returns, loan losses or warranty costs. 159 In this approach,
the company stashes accruals in cookie jars during the good times to
utilize in bad times by reducing recognized expenses because of the
accruals already made. 160 The fourth technique involves revenue
recognition. 16 1 This has been a fairly common problem. 16 2 It involves
recognizing revenue before sale is complete, before the product is
delivered, or when the customer still has options to terminate or delay
163
the sale.
The fifth technique involves misusing the concept of materiality.
Chairman Levitt set forth the following model:

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See, for example, the company's actions in In re Spectrum Brands, Inc. Sec. Litig., 461
F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1309 (N.D. Ga. 2006). Paragraph 20 of the complaint alleged:
To induce SPC's customers, including Best Buy, Menards, Wal-Mart, Kmart, Shopco,
and Toys R Us, to order unwanted product and to pull sales forward into earlier
quarters, SPC gave its customers deeper discounts, longer payment terms, and credits
towards future purchases. The highest levels of management at SPC engaged in this
channel-stuffing.
Id.
Also, paragraph 34 of the complaint provided additional detail:
According to a former national account manager, K-mart stores had on average
between 52 to 100 weeks of Rayovac batteries, with some stores holding 250 weeks of
C and D batteries. This same witness stated that Wal-Mart had 30-50 weeks of
product in inventory and even though everyone knew in January 2005 that Wal-Mart's
inventory levels and weeks on hand were way up, SPC continued to offer Wal-Mart
incentives to take additional product because "we needed to make the numbers." WalMart's inflated inventory was confirmed by a former sales analyst, employed at SPC
during the Class Period, who recalled at least "30 weeks on hand" and stated, "We all
knew what was going on, we front loaded the stores in August and September 2004 for
the Christmas holiday." This witness reiterated that executive-level management
handled every aspect of the Wal-Mart account because the Company was so dependent
on this relationship.
Id. at 1309-10.
163. Levitt, The "Numbers Game," supra note 155.
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[S]ome companies misuse the concept of materiality. They
intentionally record errors within a defined percentage ceiling. They
then try to excuse that fib by arguing that the effect on the bottom line
is too small to matter. If that's the case, why do they work so hard to
create these errors? Maybe because the effect can matter, especially if
it picks up that last penny of the consensus estimate. When either
management or the outside auditors are questioned about these clear
violations of GAAP, they answer sheepishly..
"It doesn't matter.
It's immaterial."
In markets where missing an earnings projection by a penny can
result in a loss of millions of dollars in market capitalization, I have a
hard time accepting that some of these so-called non-events simply
don't matter. 16
The Interim Report argued that the SEC should define materiality in
terms of a 5% pre-tax income threshold. 165 The assumption is that a
less than 5% error in earnings would be immaterial and of no concern to
investors. As Chairman Levitt pointed out, however, missing an
earnings projection by a penny can have a multimillion dollar impact on
market capitalization. Moreover, there is a huge difference between a
company reporting flat earnings versus 5% growth, particularly when
the market is expecting 5% growth. The effect on value is compounded
because earnings will be less, and the price-earnings multiple could well
166
be reduced also.
Lest there be any question as to whether earnings manipulation is
prevalent, CFO Magazine reported that financial executives can use
"allowable discretion" to boost or lower earnings by a few percentage

164. Id.
165. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 141, at 131. The report recounted:
For many years, the rule of thumb was that, in determining the scope of an audit, a
potential error exceeding five percent of annual pre-tax income would be considered
material. In evaluating a misstatement, an error that exceeded ten percent of pre-tax
income was considered material, while the materiality of an error between five percent
and ten percent of pre-tax income was assessed, based on various qualitative factors.
Id. at 128.
166. The capital asset pricing model posits that the discount rate is equal to the isk-free rate
plus beta times the spread between fhe market return and the risk-free rate: DR = RFR + fi(MR RFR). The capitalization rate is the discount rate minus the growth rate. CR = DR - G. Thus,
the larger the growth rate, the lower the capitalization rate. The capitalization rate is inversely
proportional to the price-earnings multiple. Thus, the larger the growth rate, the higher the priceearnings multiple. See SHANNON P. PRATT, ROBERT F. REILLY & ROBERT P. SCHwEIHS,
VALUING A BUSINESS: THE ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES 244-45

(4th ed. 2000) (discussing multiples of economic variables).
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points. 167 The magazine conducted a survey in which they asked CFOs
how much discretion they could use to affect reported earnings.

AT YOUR DISCRETION
CFOs wield considerable influence over reported earnings*
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Scope of influence with only one month left in the reporting year
Source: Management or Manipulation, CFO MACAZINE, Dec. 2006

The results of the survey, set forth in the chart below, show that
almost half of the CFOs could boost or lower earnings 3-5%, a change
16 8
that could have a huge impact on investors.
In commenting upon the situation, the magazine stated:
And the methods involved don't require a Ph.D. in finance.
Operational levers include such time-honored tactics as delaying
operational spending, accelerating order processing, and driving the
sales team harder. Accounting steps, which are less common, include
changing the timing of an accounting charge and adjusting estimates,
permissible under [Generally Accepted
both of which can be
1 69
Accounting Principles].
On a positive note, thus far in 2007, the number of accounting
restatements has decreased. 170 This may indicate that executives are
playing less loosely with their financials, possibly because the

167. Don Durfee, Management or Manipulation?, CFO MAG., Dec. 1, 2006, at 28 (stating
CFOS can influence reported earnings by three percent or more).

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Lublin & Scannel, supra note 146, at B3 (noting that the number of companies with
restatements fell to 698 from 786 in the first six-months of 2007).
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certification requirements in Sarbanes-Oxley have pushed management
toward placing a greater emphasis on internal controls.

VI. THE BUGABOO

OF OVER-REGULATION AND EXCESSIVE LITIGATION

Sarbanes-Oxley has become the focal point of criticism about
increased enforcement costs, perhaps undeservingly.
Many of
Sarbanes-Oxley's critics may have exaggerated the impact of its
regulations and blamed it for recent excessive litigation. It may be that
there is more litigation because there is more fraud, and that there is
more fraud because of our focus on short-term results. The focus on
short-term results may be partially because management has an
incentive to manipulate short-term results to hype executive
compensation.
A conservative journal lamented the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley on
the basis that it "goes against a 30-year trend of general economic
deregulation under Republican and Democratic presidents." 17'
But
perhaps deregulation is part of the problem. Enron certainly exploited,
17 2
or rather over-exploited, deregulation.
The Interim Report, in addition to raising concerns about SarbanesOxley Section 404, was also generally critical of the regulatory and
litigation burden affecting U.S. markets. 173 With respect to Rule 1Ob-5,
which governs liability for material misstatements or fraud in
connection with the sale of securities and is often the basis for holding
directors and officers liable, the report argued that "the SEC should
174
attempt to provide more guidance, using a risk-based approach."'
On the other hand, with respect to regulation of the securities
industry, the report argued for a principles-based approach. Since "a
principles-based regime gives regulated firms less guidance about
expected behavior, the SEC and the SROs must be sensitive to this
heightened ambiguity."' 175 In other words, management says, "Don't
provide us with specifics when you regulate us, but when we do
something wrong, grant us absolution because the regulation was
amorphous."

171.

Berlau, supra note 100, at 39.

172. See generally BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE
ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003) (discussing Enron's

abuses of securities law and regulations).
173. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 141, at 5, 9-15, 59-70, and 71-92 (discussing the
adverse impact of securities litigation on American markets).
174. Id. at 8, 80.
175. Id. at 8.
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In point of fact, Rule lOb-5 is a principles-based approach. In effect,
it says that it is a sin both to lie and to tell half-truths. 176 This has been,
and should continue to be, the basic ethic of the securities laws.
However, the Interim Report demonstrates how business wants to have
it both ways. From a regulatory standpoint, business wants to be cut
some slack. On the other hand, with respect to litigation that ensues
when business has breached the basic ethic of the securities laws, it
wants to constrain investors and their lawyers.
The Interim Report lamented the costs borne by business from
enforcement of the securities laws and contrasted them with lesser costs
in the United Kingdom or Europe. Although the Interim Report admits
that one of the strengths of the U.S. market may be the tough
administrative enforcement of securities laws, it believed that "the
penalties have grown disproportionately large relative to their deterrent
benefit."' 177 The Report compared the total monetary penalties for
securities violations in the United States to those in the United Kingdom
during the year 2004.178 In the United States, administrative penalties
totaled approximately $4.7 billion, and private class actions totaled $3.5
billion. 179 In comparison, private class actions do not exist in the
United Kingdom, and the administrative penalties only amounted to
approximately $40.5 million. 180 The report emphasized that directors
and officers' ("D & 0") insurance costs in the United States are six
times higher than in Europe. 18'
There could be a reason why enforcement costs are so much higher in
the United States than in Europe. For one thing, Europe does not yet
seem to match the United States in the scope and frequency of securities
fraud. Consider the table of class action settlements incorporated in the
182
Interim Report:

176. For example, the second clause of rule IOb-5 provides that it is unlawful:
To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading.
17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2007).
177. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 141, at 11.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. /d.at 76.
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Table 111.4
Ten Largest Securities Class Action Settlements Since 1995
Maximum Asserted
Issuer
Rank
$7,160.5 Million
1
Enron
$6,156.3 Million
WorldCom
2
$3,528.0 Million
3
Cendant
$2,500.0 Million
AOL Time Warner
4
$2,473.6 Million
5
Nortel Networks
$1,091.0 Million
Royal Ahold
6
$1,000.0 Million
7
IPO Allocation Litigation
$960.0 Million
8
McKesson HBOC
$673.4 Million
Lucent Technologies
9
$574.0 Million
10
Bristol-Myers Squibb
These companies were sued in connection with securities transactions
in the United States. 18 3 Eight of them are U.S. companies; Nortel is
184
Canadian, and Royal Ahold is Dutch.
These figures not only add to the cost of securities litigation, but also
impact the cost of D&O insurance in United States. It may be that we
have a litigious culture because there is so much fraud in the United
States.
Another aspect of our culture that may lead to high enforcement costs
is the obsession with short term results and stock prices. As Chairman
Levitt has stated:
While the problem of earnings management is not new, it has swelled
in a market that is unforgiving of companies that miss their estimates.
I recently read of one major U.S. company, that failed to meet its socalled "numbers" by one penny, and lost more than six percent of its
stock value in one day.
I believe that almost everyone in the financial community shares
responsibility for fostering a climate in which earnings management is
on the rise and the quality of financial reporting is on the decline.
Corporate management isn't operating in a vacuum. In fact, the
different pressures and expectations placed by, and on, various
participants in the financial community appear to be almost selfperpetuating.

183. Id.
184. Id.
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This is the pattern earnings management creates: companies try to
meet or beat Wall Street earnings projections in order to grow market
capitalization and increase the value of stock options. Their ability to
do this depends on achieving the earnings expectations of analysts.
And analysts seek constant guidance from companies to frame those
expectations. Auditors, who want
to retain their clients, are under
85
pressure not to stand in the way. 1
Another cultural obsession-that of the CEOs in their endless quest
to make more money-also drives securities fraud and raises the cost of
securities litigation.
The chart below demonstrates the almost
exponential rise in pay for CEOs, driven largely by stock options, which
in turn creates a focus on short-term results.
Ratio of CEO to average worker pay, 1965-2005
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Figure from Mishel, Lawrence, Jared Bernstein, and Sylvia Allegretto, The State of Working America 2006/2007.
An Economic Policy Institute Book, Ithaca. N.Y.: ILR Press, an imprint of Cornell University Press, 2007.

The above chart, while it shows a dramatic rising trend in the ratio of
CEO pay to worker pay, may actually be conservative. Fortune and
Money recently reported that, in 2006, the ratio of CEO pay to worker
pay was 364, down from 411 times in 2005.186 The report stated that
the record was 525 times in 2000.187 The 2000 figure squares with a

185. Levitt, The "Numbers Game," supra note 155.
186. Jeanne Sahadi, CEO pay: 364 Times More Than Workers, CNNMONEY.COM, Aug. 28,
2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/28/news/economy/ceo-pay-workers/index.htm.
187. Id. The report did acknowledge, however, that such comparisons are not precisely
"apples-to-apples" because of a recent change in 2007 in measuring CEO options. Id.
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BusinessWeek report that compared CEO compensation in United States
188
to that of other countries.
CEO Compensation as a
Multiple of Employee
Compensation
Country
Multiple
United States
531
Hong Kong
38
Britain
25
Thailand
23
China
21
France
16
Sweden
14
South Korea
11
Japan
10

It appears that executives in other countries are starting to catch up to
the largesse of United States pay in this decade. 189 As overseas
compensation increases, however, so also may incidents of overseas
financial fraud.19 0

188. Eric Wahlgren, Spreading the Yankee Way of Pay, BUS. WK., Apr. 18, 2001,
http://www.businessweek. com/careers/content/apr200l/ca20010419_812.htm.
189. See Michael Hennigan, Executive Pay and Equality in the Winner-take-all Society,
FINFACTS IR, Aug. 7, 2005, availableat http://www.finfacts.com/irelandbusinessnews/
publish/article_10002825.shtml (discussing the increasing pay gap between executives and other
employees worldwide).
190. See Mark S. Willis, Esq. & Robert M. Roseman, Esq., Global Markets, Global Fraud:
What We Can Learn From "Europe'sEnron" (May 2006), www.srk-law.com/CM/WhatsNew/
IPECA.pdf, which states:
Fraud can happen anywhere in the world, particularly as securities markets increase
the trend toward globalisation. After the Parmalat scandal shook the financial world,
the press quickly dubbed it "Europe's Enron"-making it painfully obvious that major
corporate fraud could no longer simply be considered an American phenomenon.
Indeed, the current chairman of the US Securities and Exchange Commission,
Christopher Cox, made this point in his first major speech to the public: "For more than
a year after Enron, the WorldCom, Health South, Global Crossing, Qwest, and Tyco
scandals made it appear that financial fraud was a uniquely American problem. But this
dubious distinction was shattered when the Vivendi, Royal Dutch/Shell, Parmalat and
other European frauds emerged." Recent events have only added to this list of financial
high jinks, as non-US-based companies such as DaimlerChrysler, Converium, Royal
Ahold and Repsol are now names that many investors also associate with securities
fraud.
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In point of fact, as the table below illustrates, 19 1 there has been a
in the United States after the
downward trend in securities 9litigation
2
enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley.1
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Source: Recent Trends in ShareholderClassAction Ligirigation,Todd Foster et al., NERA.

In seeking to explain this trend, the Interim Report offered the
following explanation:
First, the stock market rose for most of 2005 and 2006, reducing the
number of sudden stock price drops that might have fueled securities
litigation. The 2006 indictment of Milberg Weiss, once dominant in
representing class plaintiffs, may also have affected the filing rate. The
indictment may have deterred other firms from filing lawsuits, and it
may have become more difficult for those firms that did still wish to
file securities class action lawsuits to find or use "professional"
plaintiffs-that is, plaintiffs who are (probably) paid to participate.
Finally, it is possible that the lower filing rate reflects the success of
the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley legislation in curbing managers' incentives
to recognize income prematurely or engage in other dubious
accounting manipulations.

193

191. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 141, at 77.
192. Id. In the chart, the Market Timing cases refer to Mutual Fund Trading and the Analyst
cases refer to analysts trading stock they knew were over-valued.
193. Id.
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It is very difficult for the business community to acknowledge that
regulation may have some positive effects. The Interim Report first
focuses on a rising stock market and second on the indictment of a
plaintiffs lawyer. Only then does it acknowledge that Sarbanes-Oxley
may have curbed managerial market manipulation.
The pattern reflected in the chart above does not show any correlation
to a rising or falling stock market. Moreover, while Milberg Weiss was
indicted in 2006, the downward trend started a year earlier. Rather than
being the least likely of the possibilities, it is highly probable that
requiring the CEO and CFO to certify the company's financials and the
existence of an internal control system, coupled with increased auditor
scrutiny, is responsible for a decrease in fraudulent activity.
VII. CONCLUSION

It is universally recognized that information drives the market. The
securities acts reflect a policy of disclosure. However, it is also
universally recognized that "garbage in equals garbage out." The
corporate scandals that led to the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley
demonstrated that much of the information fed to the markets was
garbage-fraudulently manufactured garbage.
Enron and its ilk were not isolated occurrences.
CFOs have
acknowledged that they have the ability to manufacture earnings. The
upsurge in restatements following the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley,
amounting to thousands of restatements, compels the conclusion that the
market has not been receiving accurate information.
When a corporation releases financial information to the public, do
we not expect the CEO and CFO to stand behind such information?
Further, do we not expect that management would put in place internal
controls to assure that the financial information disseminated to the
market is reliable? How else can a market fulfill its price setting
function?
Business was entitled to rail against the compliance costs associated
with Sarbanes-Oxley. However, these outrageous costs stemmed not
from the legislation, but from the egregious excesses of the accounting
profession in supposedly fulfilling its assessment responsibility. Now
that the SEC has debunked the accounting profession's approach to
auditing internal controls, costs should normalize.
With respect to the outcry of business toward regulation and
litigation, there is a very simple and cost effective response: "Why Not
Tell the Truth?" Justice Brandeis observed that sunlight is a great
disinfectant. If we focus on telling the truth, rather than obfuscating
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financial results, we can have the best of all worlds: an efficient market
and minimal litigation.

